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own docks; they had to build hundreds of miles of railroads; and
they had to go into the virgin forests and cut down trees in order
to make their barracks. They had to mobilize engineers, foresters,
railroad men and construction men as well as soldiers-all this
tremendous machinery of industry had to be created over there so
as not to interrupt the war preparations of France or England;
and the stream of men going across the Atlantic today exceeds the
expectations of England and France and is a source of amazement
to them.
People will tell about our failure to produce guns here in Amer-
ica at once, but they do not say anything about the fact that we
selected the best foreign models, and gave contracts for their pro-
duction in English and French factories so that we could give them
money and give them work, and how we went to work in the mean-
time and produced the best machine gun in the world today-the
Browning. They do not say a word about these tremendous ac-
complishments-how a nation is straining every energy to help in
a great way and to the very best of our ability, but they take the
aeroplane situation, where certain inefficiencies were shown, and
they harp on it in order to throw doubt and confusion upon every
other war preparation. Let us go after the failure, let us remedy it,
let us have criticism, but let us not tear down the whole structure of
achievement when we have to replace a defective brick.
FREEDOM OF DISCUSSION IN WAR TIME
BY NORMAN ANGELL,
London, England.
I propose to deal with one phase only of the problem of the
mobilization of the public mind. It is this: what degree of
freedom of public discussion will best fit a democracy to wage war
effectively?&dquo;
It is not merely, or perhaps mainly, a governmental question,
but one which confronts newspapers and bodies like universities
and churches; one of its most important aspects is that of personal
relationships. I shall not enter into the discussion of any proposed
legislation, nor touch in any way on the attitude of the government.
 at NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIV LIB on May 21, 2015ann.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
195
Indeed, I have never been able to judge whether the administration
is now blamed for being too repressive or too liberal. Reading one
group of papers one can only conclude that the administration is
perversely encouraging all the alien enemies in the country to carry
on a propaganda against it. Reading another group of papers one
must conclude that it is set upon ruthlessly stamping out all crit-
icism of itself however honest and patriotic. Into that debate
I shall not enter in the least. The question is mainly perhaps, as I
have already suggested, an extra-governmental one. It is vastly
important and we should judge it in the light of experience.
It is surely the duty of all of us belonging to the Alliance to com-
pare notes of experience in anything that can bear upon our success.
And let us hope that we have reached now a stage of unification by
virtue of which that exchange can take place freely between differ-
ent nationals within the Alliance without implication of unseemli-
ness. I want to point out certain European experience in this matter
and-in order to disentangle issues and present something resem-
bling a clear thesis-suggest to you that that experience on the whole
points to this conclusion: A democracy, and still more a group of
democracies forming an Alliance, will wage war most effectively if
public discussion is as free as possible. Certain limitations of
course I take for granted, as that the dissemination of military
information shall be controlled by the military authority, and that
no direct incitement to resist the actual prosecution of the war shall
be permitted. But there is a natural feeling in war time that con-
trol should go much beyond this, and, as a matter of fact, in the
early stages of a war always does. Yet I suggest that such a policy,
in the case of our democracies, is to the advantage of the enemy.
THE ADVANTAGES OF PUBLIC DISCUSSION
Experience would seem to show that a democracy will get the
best results by a degree of toleration which would allow war aims
and peace terms, the justice or injustice of the war, when it ought
to stop and on what conditions, all to be freely discussed; and
would allow the socialist, pacifist and semi-pacifist to do their worst.
They might do a certain amount of harm; but less harm, in the long
run, than is done in practice by their suppression. On balance, the
advantage is on the side of toleration. Save for the limitations
already indicated, freedom of press, speech and discussion should,
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in the interest of a sane and balanced public opinion even more
necessary to democracies in war than in peace, be complete and
unhampered.
I am aware it seems ridiculous to urge such a degree of toleration
in war time. But I shall base the claim not on any ground of the
rights of minorities to certain moral or intellectual privileges.
Personally I cannot understand how any claim can be made on
that ground when the existence of a nation is at stake; how, in such
circumstances, minorities can have any rights, as against the com-
mon need, that should be regarded-but precisely on the ground of
common need, of advantage to the nation as a whole.
Public opinion in the early stages of war, in every nation,
is always in favor of a &dquo;truce to discussion.&dquo; We remind one
another then that the time for words has passed and the time for
action come. &dquo;Talk&dquo; is disparaged. We demand the union sacr6e.
And almost always is that rule first broken by those who at the
beginning were most insistent upon its enforcement. Take the
case of England. A party truce was declared at the outbreak of
war and the feeling against public criticism of the government or
its policy was intense. Such public men as attempted anything
resembling it were indeed driven from public life for a time, mainly
by the influence of the group of papers controlled by Lord North-
cliffe. What happened finally was that Mr. Asquith’s government
was driven out and replaced by another largely as the result of the
criticisms of Lord Northcliffe’s papers.
Now whether you take the view that that result was good or
bad you justify public discussion. If the result was good, if the
war was being mismanaged, the country was saved by virtue of
public discussion-by virtue of abandoning the rule of silence.
If you take the view that the result was bad you have a case where
a government found it impossible to resist the intervention of public
judgment, although it must have known that judgment to be wrong.
And if it was wrong, it must have been because the public judged
on an insufficient knowledge of the facts and made wrong con-
clusions concerning them; because in other words, public discus-
sion was not full, had not all the facts, did not hear all sides.
Either verdict pushes one to the conclusion that the public will
judge either with or without the facts and opportunity for free
discussion; and that the part of wisdom is to see that that discus-
sion is as full and well-founded in fact as possible.
 at NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIV LIB on May 21, 2015ann.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
197
We may say: &dquo;That establishes the case for the full public
discussion of the government’s administrative capacity because all
parties to the discussion are agreed upon the ultimate aim-the
winning of the war. But no purpose is served by the discussion of
war aims and peace terms during the war; or by tolerating veiled
sedition.&dquo; But the case for full discussion of aims and policy is
even clearer than the case for public discussion of the government’s
administrative capacity. Let us again take the facts of the dis-
cussion of policy in England.
FREE DISCUSSION AND THE ENGLISH PRESS
What, in practice, did the truce to discussion of peace terms or
war aims mean in the case of the English press? It meant in prac-
tice, not that the discussion ceased, but that all liberal contribution
to it did. Again one can illustrate that by the role of what we know
as &dquo;the Northcliffe Press.&dquo; And you will note that I am not
criticising or condemning the intervention of that press; I am sup-
porting it; but I am asking that the freedom ,which is accorded to
newspapers of that type should be accorded to all others. The
Northcliffe Press, far from refraining from discussion of peace
terms, began very early to discuss them most energetically. It
was mainly due to its agitation, for instance, that the Paris Eco-
nomic Conference was held to devise the economic conditions
which should obtain after the war. That was a most important
peace term. It created, right or wrongly, the impression that,
whatever happened, Germany’s trade would be met in the case of
her defeat by very hostile combinations. That may be an entirely
wise policy; I am not for the moment concerned to discuss it. But
there are two points about it to be noted: the first is that members
of the British Cabinet-one or two notably-were notoriously op-
posed to it; and the second is that the views of these members, and
of others who opposed the policy of the Conference, got no expres-
sion in the press. The public heard only one side of the case: the
case presented by the Northcliffe Press. The public, in imposing
that policy upon the government may have been right-though
as a matter of simple fact the overwhelming preponderance of
opinion is now the other way-but in that case they were right by
accident, for they certainly did not hear the case against it. I am
merely taking that Conference, which of itself had not perhaps very
 at NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIV LIB on May 21, 2015ann.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
198
great importance, as an illustration of the way in which public
judgment is shaped on other matters of policy which are vastly
more important and with which I shall deal presently. Why
was the Liberal Press silent, or relatively silent, in criticising the
policy of the Paris Conference? Because in the temper then pre-
vailing any argument against the proposed economic punishment
of the Germans would have been regarded as pro-Germanism and
the Liberal Press could not face the implication.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCUSSION
One must enter here a little into the elements of war psychology
and the psychology of discussion. I will try not to be very abstruse.
If you have ever taken part in a discussion of Protection and Free
Trade during an election you know that when feeling has begun to
run a little high the Protectionist becomes absolutely convinced that
the obvious blindness of the Free Trader to the protectionist truth
can only be accounted for by the fact that, by some moral perver-
sion, the Free Trader is more concerned with the welfare of foreign-
ers than with that of Americans. I need not remind you that for
years every Free Trader in America was an Anglomaniac, if indeed
he had not been suborned by the gold of the Cobden Club. Now if
in times of profound peace an honest attempt to find the best policy
for one’s own country can in this way be interpreted as hostility to
one’s country, merely because the proposed policy is also good for the
foreigner, how much more must we expect that kind of misappre-
hension in the immeasurably fiercer passions of war time. It is
natural, human, excusable, a phase of the instinct of pugnacity and
self-preservation, an essential element of war psychology, perhaps
indispensable to national morale.
But note how it operates in the case of the press. We agree
not to discuss peace terms. A paper of large circulation has an
article demonstrating that there will never be any peace in the
world until the enemy nation is utterly destroyed; that the people
are as much to blame as the government. It strikes nobody that
this is a discussion of policy or peace terms. A rival paper has an
article arguing that no territory must be taken from the enemy and
that we have no quarrel with the enemy people. In this case we
realize, not only that it is a discussion of terms but a very irritating
one, with a pro-German coloring to boot. And we have a general
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impression that that sort of thing ought to be suppressed. Now,
when to the handicap on the liberal paper is added the prospect of
legal penalties, its position becomes hopeless. Incidentally, when
we suppress an obscure socialist paper, the importance of the act is
not in that suppression, but in the effect that it has upon the policy
of much more powerful papers who realize that they will have to
look out and do not feel disposed to take any risks at all in such a
public temper-which doubtless extends to government officials and
to juries. The liberal press becomes silent, and control of opinion
passes to those papers that appeal to the impulsive and instinctive,
rather than to the reflective, element. This state of mind which
I have described is progressively strengthened. And a good job
too, you may say. You might quote the movie advertisement to the
effect that you cannot put up a good fight until your blood boils;
so the more it boils the better.
THE DIRECTION OF POLICY
What, then, is the job of us civilians who are left behind and
do not have to go over the top and do the bayoneting? It is, I
think we have agreed, the direction of policy. If the government is
going wrong we correct it, or replace it, and whether we intervene
wisely or not depends upon this state of mind of ours. And I am
not sure that boiling blood is .the best psychological condition for
that judgment; for the public passes upon policies, and makes a
choice between them, not by a cold intellectual analysis of their
respective merits, but by virtue of a general state of mind and
temper.
If we really are directing the fight in its larger aspects-and I
think we are agreed on that point-a certain balance and sanity of
judgment rather than violent temper may be desirable. I believe it
is a ruse of a prize fighter who is getting the worst of it to try and
make his opponent really angry. Then the opponent’s bad temper
may compensate’ for his superior strength or ability. The torreador
manages to reduce an opponent twenty times his own strength by
making that opponent literally &dquo;see red.&dquo;
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
Have there been any other definite problems of policy in which
has operated the kind of process I have described in connection with
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the Paris Conference? I think there have been questions of policy
so important that our success or failure may be determined by them.
There was, for instance, our relation to the Russian revolution.
It is easy, of course, to be wise after the event-and it is wise to be
wise after the event, because it may be duplicated in the future.
But we are probably pretty well agreed now that that event has been
mishandled by the Allies. We in Europe did not sufficiently see it
coming, and when it came, large sections of our public and press took
a line which could only irritate and alienate the strongest elements
in the revolution. It has been said very generally by many who
have studied the revolution closely that if the Allies had acceded in
time to Kerensky’s desire for a re-statement of Allied aims, the
German and Bolshevik agitation against him could have been
checked and a separate peace prevented. That may not be true;
we can never know. But if it had been true, or true in any degree,
our public temper was such that it would have stood in the way of
taking advantage of the fact; of doing what Kerensky desired.
There is an incident in our relations with Russia, small in itself,
but which illustrates clearly the way in which public &dquo;violent-
mindedness&dquo; may be responsible for disastrous errors of policy.
When Arthur Henderson was in Petrograd as the representative of
the British government, he realised the immense importance of
conciliating the left wing of the revolution and undermining the
movement for a separate peace. It happened that one particular
British Labor leader, Ramsay Macdonald, had an especial influence
in Russia. Henderson telegraphed urging that Macdonald be sent.
The government agreed; his passport was granted-whereupon a
British Trades Union, out of the intensity of its patriotism called a
seaman’s strike to prevent Macdonald’s going. Had the union
weighed the pros and cons in terms of sound policy of Macdonald’s
going to Russia? They did not even pretend to. They just did
not like Macdonald whom they regarded as pro-German. For a
year or two there had been an intense campaign on the part of
certain papers against him on that score. He was a red flag to most
patriotic Englishmen. Consequently, when it came to the question
as to whether, whatever his personal views, it might not for a special
purpose be wise to use him-as the government was prepared to
use him-the state of public temper made sober judgment impos-
sible. The action of the most intensely patriotic trades union in
 at NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIV LIB on May 21, 2015ann.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
201
Great Britain was undoubtedly of immense service to the German
cause.
For remember this: the greatest disaster so far suffered by the
Allied cause, whether that disaster was preventable or not, has been
the defection of Russia. In so far as the enemy is succeeding on the
military side that success is mainly explained by our failure to main-
tain the integrity of our Alliance. The enemy’s success is in this
sense a political success-his advantageous military position is due
to our political failures. Yet here was a British trades union out
of the very fierceness of its patriotism adding to the difficulties of
this overwhelming need of retaining Russia within the Alliance.
And that incident is merely illustrative of the fashion in which the
general temper of the public for the time being, not any cold in-
tellectual analysis of pros and cons, decides questions of policy
which may have vast, catastrophic military results. If an Italian
policy-since, it is now understood, abandoned-alienated important
elements in our Alliance like the potential co6peration of the South-
ern Slavs and the Greeks, it was because a small minority of Italians
were able to win over Italian patriotic feeling, as distinct from sober
thought, to an unwise policy. And in such matters as our future
policy to Russia-and Russia’s position may determine whether the
world is to have a preponderance of power in the future against
Prussia-our relations to Japan, and to such problems as Irish
Conscription, wise decisions will not be reached by boiling blood or
intense emotionalism. It may help to carry us along tho road,
but it does not help us to determine the right road.
And what is the right road will be sometimes an infinitely diffi-
cult decision for this reason: Our cause is maintained by an Al-
liance made up of many different states separated by diversities of
national character. Our success will depend upon whether we can
hang together. Divergencies of aim there are bound to be, and if
there cannot be a large measure of other-mindedness, of give and
take, of sympathy at times with other views larger perhaps than
we have shown in the case of Russia, disruption like that in-
volved in the Russian defection will go on.
Why do I stress the Russian incident? Because it is evident
that we have not learned its lesson. The forces which produced
the Russian revolution-a striving of the mass after entirely new
social and economic conditions-are at work in all European
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countries. Read the report of the English labor party. They
will not work out in the same way of course in England that they
did in Russia; but something of the same force is moving. What is
the attitude of the American democracy as represented by organised
American labor towards that movement? It is pretty much the
attitude which British public opinion as a whole took towards the
Russian radical groups a year or two ago. American labor seems
disposed to take the ground that the British Labor Party is pro-
German and defeatist, and it seems disposed to back the political
opponents of the British Labor Party. If it did, that would be tak-
ing sides in British politics with a vengeance; but what is much
more to the point, it would be taking the wrong side. For with-
out any sort of doubt the British Labor Party is the coming
greatest single force in British politics. Are we to see the mon-
strous spectacle of American organised labor in alliance with British
and French reaction, with the enemies of British and French
labor in their own country? Recent events seem to indicate that
that is quite a possibility. If it were realised it would certainly not
add to the strength of the alliance of the western democracies.
NECESSITY OF FREE DISCUSSION
Yet if we are to have any assurance that it is to be prevented
there must be a very large measure of freedom of discussion of war
aims and peace terms, and what French-British socialism stands for
and what it does not. One may doubt whether hand-picked govern-
mental delegations from either side of the Atlantic will be any more
successful in maintaining the essential solidarity of aim of the democ-
racies than have been similar methods in the case of Russia.
Those who urge resort in our case to the methods of Germany
in the matter of the press and speech seem to overlook two vital
differences between the enemy’s case and ours. The unity of
Germany’s alliance can be maintained by the sheer preponderance of
power of one member in it, imposing a common policy and aim.
Our Alliance is not dominated by any one member who can impose
unity of aim and purpose. Our unification depends upon the free
co6peration of equals. And if we do not learn give and take, and
what our respective purposes really are, we cannot attain that unity
and our Alliance will go to pieces. That ultimately will give the
advantage to the enemy even though the sum of our power may
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be greater than his. The second difference is that he has a long
training in moral docility and subservience to government where we
have not. Where repression really will &dquo;repress&dquo; with him, it will
not with us. A policy which he could apply safely to Ireland, or
to socialists or labor or what not, would in the case of certain Al-
lied peoples undoubtedly cause rebellion.
The truth is that we have not yet formed our Alliance in the
sense of deciding its common purposes; whether or not the purposes
of Britain are those of the labor party, and France and Italy those
of the socialists; what is to be the American relation to the conflicting
claims of the various parties, as well as to the aims of Russia and
Japan and Ireland and India. The decisions and adjustments in
these things cannot be made by intense emotionalism, and violent-
mindedness. Unless we keep alive the tradition of free discussions
and the feeling for toleration of diverse opinion, we shall undoubtedly
have that violent-mindedness and passion, and many of these ques-
tions will in that case be decided in that temper. If that is the
case Russia will not mark the only rupture in the Alliance, and the
outlook will be very dark.
The service that the heretic, political or religious, does is not
necessarily to give us the right view; he generally perhaps gives us
the wrong. What he does by his objections is to compel us to take
stock of our own ideas, when otherwise they would remain unex-
amined, and so to modify them where they are faulty. That service
we need in war time.
WHAT ARE THE REAL MOTIVES OF REPRESSION 2
It is worth while to examine our motives in such things as these.
The old inquisitor, and the mobs who watched the burning of here-
tics or massacred them, were quite sure that they were acting for
the glory of God, and because they loved truth. But the simpler
and perhaps truer explanation is that they did those things be-
cause they hated the heretic; that they were moved by what is
perhaps one of the fiercest of human instincts and one of the most
powerful motives in all history-the instinct to inflict pain upon
those guilty of the insufferable presumption of disagreeing with us.
We may really be convinced that we shall add to the solidarity
of our Alliance, and understand better what to do about Russia, and
Japan, and labor, and Ireland, and ship building, and co6rdination,
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and traffic congestion, and Congressional control and a thousand
and one similar questions by an embargo on German music or by
severe measures against elderly pacifist clergymen. But in times as
grave as these it is worth our while perhaps to see which motive we
really put first.
THE ATTITUDE OF PUBLIC OPINION TOWARDS
CONGRESS
BY HENRY JONES FORD, PH.D.,
Princeton University.
It is a wise saying that criticism is easy but performance is
difficult. It is always the case when difficult and important tasks
are being carried on that there are opportunities for fault finding
and complaint. The important thing is that means should exist
by which public opinion can act intelligently on the subject. Now
saying everything in favor of the press that the press would say
for itself-and you will admit that is a great deal-I think that I
can ask you to bear witness that pure and unsullied devotion to the
truth was not always conspicuous and ever manifest in the press
even before we had the censorship. And is it not the case that the
very idea, the essential characteristic of constitutional government, is
that we shall not be dependent upon such outside agencies but that
the government itself should be so organized that it would include
the function of control; that the activities of the constituted organs
of authority should be suflicient to define responsibility and to
apportion praise or blame where it is justly due? What is repre-
sentative government except representing the interests of the people
and giving to them exact and effective expression?
There is a marked disposition to speak in terms of disparagment
of the behavior of Congress in this emergency and I think it is im-
portant at the outset to say that you cannot possibly reach a fair
judgment on questions of this kind if you approach the matter
merely from its personal aspects. The general idea seems to be
that members of Congress are not fully up to their duty and re-
sponsibility and that their personal defects are the cause of trouble,
whereas the true ground of criticism is the character of the system
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